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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KENT R. FULLMER, 
Defendant. 
Appellate No. 950793-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal from a final judgement of the Third 
Circuit Court, and Defendant does not contest the jurisdiction 
recital of the City under Section 78-2a-3(2) (d), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
ISSUE: Did the trial judge correctly dismiss the charge against 
Appellee in finding that the vehicle must be moving, and are there 
other grounds to support the verdict as recited by the Judge? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City centers its Appeal around the finding of the Court 
that the vehicle was not moving, but ignores other statements 
in the ruling of the Court, which appear to be sufficient grounds 
to support the ruling independent of the "moving-not moving" statement. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
It is unfortunate that the entire proceedings were not transcribed. 
The Defendant had gone to the apartment to retrieve some personal 
property at a friends residence, including this gun, which he stated 
"that he was told by the person from whom he acquired the gun that it 
did not work, or words to that effect". He had not tested the gun and Wc 
retrieving it for the purpose of having a gunsmith determine what 
needed to be repaired. He found that some of the running lights on 
the vehicle were not working and proceeded to attempt to make them 
work by getting under the dashboard to find a fuse or some bad 
connection or whatever it was. He had placed the gun on the front 
seat and removed it from the box in which it had been stored, and 
placed the box on the rear seat, and the gun on the front seat, where, 
from his moving around and hitting or bumping into the seat, the gun 
fell under the armrest (and may have fallen between the seats in 
front). 
It was in this situation that the officers arrived on the scene and 
one talked to him and loaned him a flashlight to work on the wiring 
and held it while Mr. Fullmer worked on the wiring under the dash. 
At this point, the car had not been moved, and there was no evidence tha 
I recall which put him sitting on the front seat, although the City 
states only that Kent was in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
I do not recall if he got the lights fixed, but it was after 
these events that the officers requested identification, ultimately 
resulting in the finding of an outstanding warrant for some other 
cause. They then searched the vehicle, after arresting Mr. Fullmer 
on the warrant, although I believe the car was released to Mr. Fullmers 
father, or the owner of it. 
In the ruling on the Verdict, the Court determined that the 
evidence which Mr. Fullmer gave was not sufficient to take the 
gun out of the statutory definition. 
The Court also ruled concerning all evidence that the testimony 
"' has credible-credibility problems." 
The Court in its ruling also set a standard that to be accessible 
under 501 (2) (L) (Utah Code Annotated)— "anything in the vehicle 
that's within certainly arms length could be said to be 
carried." This would be under the statute, according to the Ruling, 
the equivalent of being carried on the person or in such close proximity 
(as to constitute a carrying or concealment). 
The Court also commented"that to place the gun in a stationary car v 
the same as placing it in a room someplace." 
The evidence showed that he intended to drive the car home that 
evening, but when he found the not working light problem, he changed 
his intention to be to not drive the car until the lights worked, and 
he was working on the lights when the officers arrived. I do not recall 
that he ever did get the lights working satisfactorily, and he 
was arrested before he could make a determination of whether or not to 
drive. 
Incidentally, the security officer for the apartment apparently 
called the police, but no evidence of "suspicion" was given by him 
or the officers for them to check his Identification. It was 
the equivalent of a single isolated unwarranted stop. There was 
no further evidence as to whether or not he intended to recase the 
gun before he moved the car. (Suspicion being no articulable reason) 
It was for all of these and other pieces of the evidence that 
the Court made its negative finding of lack of credibility of the 
evidence. 
SUMMARY~0F THE ARGUEMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT 
NOT GUILTY FOR THE GUN NOT BEING "CARRIED", 
FOR THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
CREDIBLE AND DID NOT PROVE BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN ARMS LENGTH 
OR READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THE GUN, AND THAT THE 
GUN BEING IN AN UNMOVED VEHICLE WAS JUST ANOTHER 
STORAGE PLACE UNTIL THE VEHICLE WAS MOVED. 
In order to find a defendant guilty, the Court must find in 
accordance with Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Annotated, that the 
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the 
crime, and that the defendant has the culpable mental state. The 
City charged him under a week old statute. Inadequate or no 
evidence put him on the drivers seat or within arms reach or 
readily accessible to the weapon. There was no testimony on 
intent except the fact of the gun and he being in the vehicle. 
The Court also found the vehicle to be like a room, until 
the vehicle was moved. 
Under those facts and the Courts ruling, the ruling was 
proper by itself without consideration of the discussion that 
the vehicle must be moving. There is no testimony about whether 
or not the arm rest was fixed or hinged, so as to make the gun 
readily accessible, if the defendant was on the front seat. 
The ruling of the court is consistent with the reality of 
the fact situations of cars and weapons. It is clear that there 
was no evidence of his intent to conceal a weapon in the car. It 
accidentally got concealed. At some point it is lawful to carry 
the weapon and place it in the car, and at what point does it become 
unlawfulto have a gun in a car and to take it out to look at it 
(out of its case or holster). Does that constitute a crime? or 
is there not a crime until the defendant is in the car on the seat 
readily accessible to the gun, and determines with finality to be in 
the car with the gun encased or not encased. A citizen would have 
difficulty dealing with this statute, as to know what to do. 
ARGUEMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY ACUUITTED THE DEFENDANT 
BECAUSE THE CITY DID NOT PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The City has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Section 76-1-501 Utah Code Annotated. The Court determined and 
made a finding that the evidence was with " credibility problems." 
If the evidence is not credible, a reasonable doubt exists. If 
the evidence is not credible, the City has failed to prove all of 
the elements of the crime. The evidence was therefore not 
credible as to the question as to the " readily accessible " 
element in the statute. The Court also ruled that to be readily 
accessible that the gun must be within arms length, and the 
evidence was not credible as to whether or not the defendant was 
on the drivers seat, or in front of the drivers seat, and under 
the steering wheel, and obviously not within arms length, and when 
he was working under the dash, that would be a cramped position and 
the readily accessible test would fail, without adequate testimony. 
The Statute on Intent is 76-2-304, Utah Code Annotated. 
The expression by the Court in the Verdict to the effect that 
the " testimony that certainly has credible—credibility problems." 
is a negative statement about credibility of the testimony, otherwise 
the Court would not have expressed the word "problems", if that is 
not true, then the Court would be expected to state that the testi-
mony was all credible.Credibility is defined in WELISKA'S Case 1926, 
131 Atl. 860 at 862. (headnote #5) 
The credibility of testimony, its capacity for 
being believed, is one of the things to be settled 
before weighing it. It the testimony has not this 
quality there is no occasion for weighing it. 
As these facets of the case are presented, I feel that the 
finding and Ruling of the Court are sufficient on these grounds 
alone. As to the statutory wording being changed, and some still 
being similar or unchanged, all of the words of the statute are 
are not the same, and are subject to interpretation of all of the 
words. If thewords changed, then the elements must have changed. 
The Williams case 636 P2d 1092-1981, as quoted is now 16 years old 
and the Legislature is still trying to place a fair law upon the 
Statutes.The statute as written leaves much to the discretion of 
the police officer and prosecutor attempting to enforce it, especially 
as to what point of time, in a case like this, does the actor commit 
the conduct proscribed and thence do a criminal act. 
Counsel speaks about injury to the public, but the officers on 
the scene had no expressed concern for their safety 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence being "—with credibility problems—", the burden 
of proof having failed to be met, the elements and intent having 
failed to have been proven, the finding of the Court of Not Guilty 
should be sustained by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 2nd day of May, 1996. 
w luy/Tru'i 
Boyd M. /(Fullmer 
Attorney for the Appellee 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to the City prosecutor at the following address and with 
postage prepaid and deposited in the U S Mail on this 3 d aY o f 
May, 1996. 
Mr. Elliot R. Lawrence 
Attorney for Appellant 
West Valley City Hall 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119. 
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ADDENDA 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, 
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
•jiat there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
fupport a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fgct necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be 
jet aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 1974 
70.1-403. Former prosecut ion barring subsequent 
prosecut ion for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have ^een tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier offsets or in a determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of 
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a 
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; 
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has 
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury 
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judg-
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to 
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defen-
dant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdict ion — Prosecut ion in 
other jurisdict ion barring prosecution in 
state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one 
* more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this 
state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecu-
tion in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those 
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Cir-
cumstances . 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen-
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney 
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to 
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of 
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or sirrilar collateral attack. 
1973 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1978 
76-1-502. Negat ing defense by al legat ion or proof — 
When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or 
other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of 
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution 
or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative 
defense. 1973 
76-1-503. Presumption of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or 
other penal statute has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presump-
tion exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact 
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed 
fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a pre-
sumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while 
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to 
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or 
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant. 1973 
76-2-303 CRIMINAL CODE 180 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into com-
mitting the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforce-
ment officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation 
with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when 
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the 
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct 
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even 
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to 
constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall 
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit 
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten 
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may 
permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was 
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the 
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue 
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. Any 
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment 
shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense 
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall 
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant 
testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies 
and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on 
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
1973 
76-2-304^ Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or mean-
ing of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reason-
ably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, 
and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an adminis-
trative agency charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in 
an opinion of a court of record or made by a public 
servant charged by law with responsibility for inter-
preting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law 
may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may 
nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which 
he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed. 
1974 
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense. 
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a 
violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-
103.1; or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-404.1; or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that 
the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of age 
or older at the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of 
the victim's true age. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an attempt to 
commit that crime, that the actor mistakenly believed the 
victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged 
offense or was unaware of the victim's true age. 1983 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influ-
ence of alcohol or other substance voluntarily 
consumed — Definition. 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or 
ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness 
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses 
known as "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity." 
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily 
consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or vola-
tile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused 
from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that 
substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behav-
ioral functioning. A mental defect may be a congenital condi-
tion, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental 
retardation. Mental illness does not mean a personality or 
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by re-
peated criminal conduct. 
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage 
general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the 
developmental period as defined by the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association 
1990 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal 
charge unless such intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if 
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of 
an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of 
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
prosecution for that offense. IWS 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior to of-
fense. 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an 
actor's criminal responsibility arises from his own conduct or 
from being a party to an offense under Section 76-2-202 that 
prior to the commission of the offense, the actor voluntaril) 
terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission 
and either: 
(1) gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement 
authorities or the intended victim; or 
(2) wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness m 
the commission. 1"5 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses. 
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative 
defenses. &* 
PART 4 
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for an} 
offense based on the conduct. The defense of justification ma> 
be claimed: 
primers and boosters, R.DX, P.E.T.N., electric and 
nonelectric blasting caps, exploding cords commonly 
called detonating cord, detcord, or primacord, picric 
acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitroglyc-
erin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemi-
cal mixture intended to explode with fire or force; 
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or simi-
lar device; and 
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb, 
chemical bomb, or similar device, including any de-
vice, except kerosene lamps, if criminal intent has not 
been established, which consists of or includes a 
breakable container including a flammable liquid or 
compound and a wick composed of any material 
which, when ignited, is capable of igniting the flam-
mable liquid or compound or«any breakable container 
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that 
explodes with fire or force and can be carried, thrown, 
or placed. 
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not 
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition. 
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means 
any substances or materials or combinations which have 
been prepared or altered for use in the creation of an 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These sub-
stances or materials include: 
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been 
altered in such a manner as to be used as the arming 
device in an explosive; 
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been 
prepared for a pipe bomb; and 
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers, 
chemical time delays, electronic time delays, or com-
mercially made or improvised items which, when 
used singly or in combination, may be used in the 
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby 
trap, or activating mechanism for any explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device. 
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not 
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any sig-
naling device customarily used in operation of railroad 
equipment. 
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply 
o: 
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official 
capacity transporting or otherwise handling explosives, 
chemical, or incendiary devices; 
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United 
States or Utah National Guard while acting in his official 
capacity; 
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under 
the provisions of Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any 
employee of such permittee acting within the scope of his 
employment; 
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an im-
porter, wholesaler, or display operator under the provi-
sions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections 11-3-3.2 and 
11-3-3.5; and 
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device as part of its 
lawful business operations. 
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
assesses or controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
tevice is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly: 
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or 
incendiary device in the commission of or an attempt to 
commit a felony; or 
person or property tnrougn me use oi an explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device, is guilty of a felony of the 
first degree. 
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
removes or causes to be removed or carries away any explo-
sive, chemical, or incendiary device from the premises where 
said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is kept by the 
lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the 
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony 
of the second degree. 
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
possesses any explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 1993 
76-10-307. Del ivery to common carrier, mail ing, or 
p lacement on premises . 
Every person who delivers or cjfeses to be delivered to any 
express or rail way company or other common carrier, or to any 
person, any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing 
it to be the device, without informing the common carrier or 
person of its nature, sends it through the mail, or throws or 
places it on or about the premises or property of another or in 
any place where another may be injured thereby in his person 
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 1993 
76-10-308. Explosive, chemical , or incendiary dev i ce — 
Venue of prosecut ion for shipping. 
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly de-
livers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any 
person for transmission without the consent or direction of the 
lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in which he 
delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted. 1993 
76-10-309. Repealed. 1993 
PART 4 
FENCES 
76-10-401. F e n c i n g of shafts a n d wel ls . 
Any person who has sunk or shall sink a shaft or well on the 
public domain for any purpose shall inclose it with a substan-
tial curb or fence, which shall be a t least four and one-half feet 
high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
PARTS 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a 
constitutionally protected right, the Legislature finds the 
need to provide uniform laws throughout the state. Ex-
cept as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the 
United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be: 
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchas-
ing, transporting, or keeping any firearm at his place 
of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle 
under his control; or 
(ii) required to have a permit or license to pur-
chase, own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm, 
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this 
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipali-
ties. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to 
the state except where the Legislature specifically del-
egates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifi-
cally authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local 
authority may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regu-
lation, or rule pertaining to firearms. 
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(2) As used in this part: 
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a danger-
ous weapon that is covered, hidden, or secreted in a 
manner that the public would not be aware of its 
presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a 
concealed dangerous weapon if it is a firearm which is 
unloaded and is securely encased. 
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, mur-
der, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, 
burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accom-
panied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an 
attempt to commit any of these offenses. 
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a crimi-
nal background check conducted by a licensed firearms 
dealer on every purchaser of a handgun through the 
division or the local law enforcement agency where the 
firearms dealer conducts business. 
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall 
be used in determining whether a knife, or any other item, 
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or 
thing was used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instru-
ment, object, or thing may be used. 
(e) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under 
crimes and criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and en-
gaged in the business of selling, leasing, or otherwise 
transferring a handgun, whether the person is a retail or 
wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
(f) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Techni-
cal Services Division of the Department of Public Safety, 
created in Section 53-5-103. 
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, 6awed-
off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that 
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by action of an explosive. 
(h) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which 
fires, is designed to fire, or can be readily restored to fire, 
automatically more than one shot without manual reload-
ing by a single function of the trigger. 
(i) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form 
created by the division to be completed by a person 
purchasing, selling, or transferring a handgun from a 
dealer in the state. 
(j) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm 
of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any 
shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length 
of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or 
magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches. 
(k) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is 
unlawful to discharge a firearm. 
(1) "Readily accessible for immediate use" means that a 
firearm or other dangerous weapon is carried on the 
person or within such close proximity and in 6uch a 
manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if 
carried on the person. 
(m) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a 
shotgun having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches 
in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or 
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any danger-
ous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration, 
modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has 
an overall length of fewer than 26 inches. 
(n) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for 
immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed 
case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or 
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove 
box or console box. 1996 
76-10-504. Carrying concea led dangerous w e a p o n . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsec-
tions (2) and (3): 
76-10-502. When w e a p o n d e e m e d loaded. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described in this part shall be 
deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended cartridge, 
shell, or projectile in the firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded 
when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a 
position whereby the manual operation of any mechanism 
once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile 
to be fired. 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded 
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball 
or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 1990 
76-10-503. Purchase or possess ion of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permit ted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of the United States, this state, or 
any other state, government, or country, or who is ad-
dicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been 
declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in 
his possession or under his custody or control any danger-
ous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony 
may not have in his possession or under his custody or 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any 
handgun described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other 
state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance 
as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Sec-
tion 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as 
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has 
been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces 
under dishonorable conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the 
United States, has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 1994 
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(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon 
which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily 
accessible for immediate use which is not securely en-
cased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit 
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is a 
firearm and that contains no ammunition is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ammu-
nition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a 
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a 
crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the 
person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person en-
gaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife 
as defined in Title 23 from carrying a concealed weapon or a 
concealed firearm with a barrel length of four inches or greater 
as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur: 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of 
that municipality's ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 
41-6 -1 . 1995 
76-10-605. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle, on 
street, or in prohibited area. 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not 
carry a loaded firearm: 
(a) in or on a vehicle; 
(b) on any public street; or 
(c) in a posted prohibited area. 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
1990 
76-10-505.5. Possession of a dangerous weapon, fire-
arm, or sawed-off shotgun on or about school 
premises — Penalty. 
( D A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, fire-
arm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that the person knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises. 
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shotgun on or 
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons au-
thorized to possess a firearm as provided under Sections 
53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10-510, 76-10-511, 76-10-
523, and Subsection 76-10-504(2) and as otherwise authorized 
by law. 
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more 
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school 
premises. 1993 
76-10-506. Threaten ing with or us ing dangerous 
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence 
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully 
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
Tiisdemeanor. 1992 
T6-10-507. Posses s ion of deadly weapon with intent to 
assault. 
Every person having upon his person any dangerous 
veapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of 
1 class A misdemeanor. 1973 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near 
highway, or in direction of any person, build-
ing, or vehicle. 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous 
weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of 
the state; 
(iv) at any communications equipment or property 
of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or 
devices of transmission or distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including 
any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated 
camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat 
ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the 
dangerous weapon from the owner or person in 
charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal 
is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry yard, 
corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this 
section that the person being accused had actual permis-
sion of the owner or person in charge of the property at the 
time in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B 
misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a firearm under any 
of the following circumstances not amounting to criminal 
homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a 
third degree felony: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of 
any person or persons, knowing or having reason to 
believe that any person may be endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an-
other or with intent to damage a habitable structure as 
defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in 
the direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an-
other, discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when, that 
person is in lawful defense of self or others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in 
Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-523 and as otherwise pro-
vided by law. 1995 
76-10-509. Possess ion of dangerous w e a p o n by minor. 
( D A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a 
dangerous weapon unless he: 
(a) has the permission of his parent or guardian to have 
the weapon; or 
(b) is accompanied by a parent or guardian while he 
has the weapon in his possession. 
(2) Any minor under 14 years of age in possession of a 
dangerous weapon shall be accompanied by a responsible 
adult. 
(3) Any person who violates this section is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor upon the first offense; and 
(b) a class A misdemeanor for each subsequent offense. 
1993 (2nd a&) 
76-10-509.4. Prohibit ion of possess ion of cer ta in weap-
ons by minors. 
( D A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a 
handgun. 
(2) Except as provided by federal law, a minor under 18 
years of age may not possess the following: 
wnemei, bo mr an aypmuu •••• • — ^ ^ M 
the note in question was "in reality * • * 
a contract by her as surety for her husband," 
saying that, if it was such a contract, "then, 
without regard to its form, it would be Toid 
Tinder the Act of June 8, 1893 (P. L. 344)." 
After reading the evidence, written and 
oral, we find no abuse of discretion. 
The order appealed from is affirmed 
BENNETT v. HATHORN et al. 
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. IFeb.. 5, 
1926.) 
Evidence <S=>584(3)—Weight to be given evi-
dence depends, not on number of witnesses, 
but on quality of testimony. 
The weight to be given evidence depends 
not so much on number of witnesses as on the 
quality or power of their testimony to convince 
of the truth. I 
On Motion from Superior Court,~Penobscot 
County, at Law. 
. Action by Milton C. "Bennett against F. 
Herbert Hathorn and another. On general 
motion by defendants for a.new trial. Mo-
tion overruled. 
Argued before WTLSON, c. J.,. Ana FHJLLr 
BROOK, DUNN. MORRILL. STURGIS. and 
BASSETT, JJ. 
Pattangall, Locke & Perkins, of Augusta, 
for plaintiff. 
Fellows & Fellows, of Bangor, for defend-
ants. 
PER CURIAM. This is an action to re-
cover stipulated compensation as the pastor 
of the "Klan Church," so called, in Brewer 
and Bangor, under an alleged contract be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendants. * The 
action is based upon a typewritten^ letter, | 
dated at Brewer, December 19,^1923, signed 
with a typewriter, "F. Herbert Hathorn, 
Brewer, D. D. Terrill, Bangor," in which the 
period of employment is fixed at 18 months, 
and the compensation at $45 per week and 
house rent. D The*4* plea ' is'tiy/-general issue! 
There was no" denial of signature by affidavit 
tinder rule X. The case~is before5the law 
court upon a general motion by-defendants 
for a new trial. 
Under the general issue the defendants in-
troduced evidence which they assert supports 
the following defenses: (1) That "they did not 
contract with the plaintiff to serve-as pastor 
of the-"man C h u r ^ 
signed, nor authorized .any, person • tof affix-
their names to, the letter: in "question, and 
that neither of them saw or knew of the let-
ter until several months after i t s date ;,, (2) I 
"Klan C h u r c h ^ n J u T ^ S ^ B S S ^ n ^ ^ ^ ^ 
and oh July. 24, 1924, in Bangor, and that his 
resignation was accepted; (3) that on Octo-
ber 25,1924, he -was paid the amount of back 
salary due him to that date. On the brief 
defendants' counsel has argued another point, 
viz. that by accepting the office of "Kleagle," 
and performing the duties thereof, the plain-
tiff had himself broken the contract, or at 
least had abandoned his position-of pastor, 
t and renounced the contract; -• - : -
We need only to say that an examination 
[of the record discloses so many improbabili-
ties, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the 
I evidence that the jury were fully warranted 
j in accepting the \ plaintiff's version of fne 
transactions in question; ^ .We. take occasion 
to repeat, as frequently stated on former oc-
casions, that the weight to be given to evi-
dence presented depends not so much on the 
number of witnesses as upon the quality or 
power of their testimony-to convince of the 
truth'. 
Motion overruled. 
WELISKA'S CASE. 
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Feb. 5. 
L926.) 
1. Master and servant <@=>388—Conclusive pre-
I sumption under statute that dependency of 
child under 18 years is entire. 
Though Laws 1921, c. 222, § 1, relating to 
dependents, is ambiguous, one intended mean-
ing is that, when no dependent parent survives 
deceased employee,' conclusive presumption is 
that dependency of decedent's less than 18 year 
old legitimate child is entire, providing state of 
child when, parent died was that of reliance on 
him for subsistence. 
2. Master and servant $=>388 — Dependency 
condition of compensation. 
Dependency is condition nrecedent to award 
of -compensation. 
3. Master and servant <g=>388—Test of (child's 
dependency stated. 
Mere giving of assistance by *' divorced fa-
ther living apart from daughter .does .not of it-
self make ^ daughter dependent, but further test 
is whether .she had necessity. therefor;in her life 
I station, and whether she counted on/guciucon-
tributions for her livelihood. 
4. Evidence ^=»596 (I)—'^Vague- and unsatis-
factory" testimony defined. 
"Vague- and 'unsatisfactory"^testimony is 
that .which,is dim and shadowy and fails to re-
lieveith^, mind'Of ;the trier of facts from doubt 
or uncertainty. 
5;-Evtdence^==>588--<,Credilj|Iity,f'of testimony 
must be decided *bef ore weighing i t 
"Credibility".- of * testimony which; is * its ca-
1 pacity, for bemg:/beUejedtVmust b^e -settled be-
, in ail .Key-Numbered DUesta^ and Indexei £=»For other cases see -same topic and KEY-Nt) 
(131 
fore weighing it, since there is no occasion for 
weighing it if it has not this quality. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words 
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Credible 
—Credibility.] 
6. Master and servant <§=>417(7)-.industrial 
Accident Commission's decision of facts con-
clusive. 
Where Industrial Accident Commission had 
decided certain evidence was vague and unsatis-
factory, held, province of such commission, which 
has exclusive right to decide facts, cannot be in-
vaded by arbitrary unauthorized court order 
that such testimony must be accepted as involv-
ing both persuasion and decision. 
On Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, 
Hancock County, in Equity. 
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act by Mary Weliska for the death of 
Stanley Weliska, her father, claimant, op-
posed by the Lincoln Pulp Wood Company. 
From an order of the Industrial Accident 
Commission denying compensation, claimant 
appeals. Appeal dismissed and decree af-
firmed. 
Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHlLr-
BROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, STURGIS, and 
BARNES, JJ. 
Peter- M. McDonald and Aretas E. Stearns, 
both of Rumford, for appellant. 
Louis 0. Stearns, of Bangor, for appellee. 
DUNN, J. The net result of the record 
is that the appeal from the decree denying 
compensation to the child of the fatally in-
jured workman, on the ground of the Jack 
of proof of dependency, must be dismissed. 
[1] The statute applicable appears to be 
ambiguous. After defining "dependents" as 
members of an employee's family or next of 
kin, whom he was sustaining either wholly 
or partly by his earnings when he was in-
jured, there is, relationally to the conclusive 
presuming of the total dependency of chil-
dren, in the case of an employee deceased, 
the clause following: 
"(c) A child or children, including adopted 
and step-children under the age of eighteen 
years for over said age, but physically or men-
tally incapacitated from earning) upon the par-
ent with whom he is or they are living, or upon 
whom he is or they are dependent at the time 
of the death of said parent, there being no sur-
viving dependent parent. In case there is more 
than one child thus dependent, the compensation 
shall be divided equally among them." 1921 
Laws, chap. 222, § 1. 
Resolving it, that legislation, by the accept-
ed use of language, has for one intended 
meaning this: When no dependent parent is 
surviving a deceased employee, conclusive 
presumption is that the dependency of the 
dead man's less than 18 year old legitimate 
child is entire, providing the state of the 
A.) 
child when the parent died, and notwith-
standing they were-living apart from one 
another, was that of reliance upon him for 
subsistence. 
[2, 3] "Dependency," said Chief Justice Cor-
nish, in <words that still are living, "is a 
condition precedent to award of compensa-
tion." Henry's Case, 124 Me. 104, 126 A. 
286. The mere receiving of assistance, on 
the authority of the same decision, does not 
of itself make the recipient a dependent 
Granting that there were contributions, the 
yet further test for dependency is: Had the 
accepting one necessity therefor in his life 
station, and were they counted on by him 
for his means of livelihood? 
While Stanley Weliska was working reg-
ularly for, and because and out of his em-
ployment by, the Lincoln Pulp Wood Com-
pany, in the Hancock county woods, on June 
3, 1924, the limb of a falling tree accidental-
ly struck his skull and fractured it. He died 
that very day. 
Four years before his wife had divorced 
him, for utter desertion over the three-year 
period immediately preceding her libel, in 
Oxford county. At the same time, the one 
child of the marriage which met judicial 
dissolution was decreed by the court in care 
and custody of the mother with whom she 
always had lived, and now is living in the 
mother's new marriage home in Massachu-
setts. This child, aged 12 years, is the peti-
tioner in these proceedings. The divorced 
husband never remarried. If he died leaving 
living parents, for anything that is shown, 
they are self-supporting. 
At the hearing, there was but one issue, 
ft of the petitioner's dependency; the re-
spondent's answer raising nothing else. Mit-
chell's Case, 121 Me. 455, 118 A. 287, <33 A-
L. R. 1447; McCollor's Case, 122 Me. 136,119 
A. 194. 
There is evidence that the father at odd 
intervals, to within three or four months of 
the fateful day, came from Rumford or else-
where in Maine, as the place of his employ-
ment was, to Lawrence in the other state, 
and meeting his child more or less slyly and 
clandestinely from her mother, made to the 
child gifts of money, the most of which has 
been appropriated toward, and some of which 
is in saving for, her maintenance. 
So the child attested. And her mother and 
a neighbor witnessed similarly, but with not 
so much detail. 
[4] The Industrial Accident. Commission, 
Chairman Thayer sitting, characterized the 
testimony as "vague and unsatisfactory." 
This is taken to mean that it was dim and 
shadowy and failed to relieve the mind of 
the trier of facts from doubt or uncertainty. 
No other evidence being offered on the indis-
pensable point of dependency, the petition 
was denied. 
' Argument is for or agninst'the proposition 
that, as the testimony was uncontradicted, 
a consenting mind ought to have received it, 
and on reflection found it sufficient for the 
awarding of compensation. 
The appellant loses. 
[5] The credibility of testimony, its capac-
ity for being believed, is one of the things 
to be settled before weighing i t If the testi-
mony has not this quality there is no occa-
sion for weighing i t The testimony pressed 
upon attention was tested and found want-
ing. For probatory purpose it was as light 
as nothingness, in the faithful though per-
haps erroneous judgment of the commission, 
and hence negative decision was recorded. 
That decision ended controversy. 
[6] As the compensation law is, the right 
to decide facts is invested exclusively in the 
Industrial Accident Commission, and the 
province of that tribunal may not be invad-
ed by an arbitrary unauthorized court order 
that certain testimony must be accepted as 
involving both persuasion and decision. OrfFs 
Case, 122 Me. 114, 119 A. 67. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Decree below affirmed. 
LIBBY et a!, v. YORK SHORE WATER CO. 
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Feb. 5, 
1926). 
1. Mandamus <§=>I54(2)—Petition addressed 
to individual member of Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
Petition for mandamus should be addressed^ 
personally to individual member of Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, distinguishably from him presid-
ing as justice in term time, in view of Rev. St. 
c. 107, § 17. 
2. Mandamus <§=» 171—Limitary provisions af-
fect neither time and place of hearing nor 
notice to others concerned. 
Limitary provisions affect neither time and 
place of hearing petition for mandamus, nor 
previous notice which others concerned shall 
have, but corrective means will reach discre-
tion unmistakably abused. 
3. Mandamus <©=> 159—Hearing petition has to 
do with "alternative writ." 
Hearing of petition for mandamus has to 
do with granting or denying of "alternative 
writ," which determines nothing in favor of 
either party, but has resemblance to interlocu-
tory order to show cause, and is obeyed by an-
swering. 
• [Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words 
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Alter-
native Writ.] 
4. Mandamus @=> 164 (2)—Requirements of re-
turn stated. 
Where return, which is answer to alterna-
tive writ, does not show compliance with man-
date or command of such writ, it must either 
deny facts which writ sets out or state other 
facts sufficient in law to defeat petitioner's 
claim. 
5. Mandamus <©=*165—Petitioner may demur to 
return. 
Petitioner may, instead of challenging some 
matter of fact alleged by opposite party, de-
mur to return to alternative writ of mandamus 
advancing issue which, as if raised by traverse, 
he mnst maintain, in view of Rev. St c 107* 
§ 18. * 
6. Mandamus <§=>( 87 (4)—Justice may reserve 
questions of law for fuil court. 
Justice hearing petition for mandamus may 
reserve questions of law for full court. 
7. Mandamus <§=>!87(4,9)—Exceptions argua-
ble only after judgment and decree; in argu-
ing exceptions, erroneous ruling in law or 
misuse of discretionary control must be 
shown. 
Exceptions saved in mandamus proceed-
ing are arguable on certification of Chief Jus-
tice only after judgment and decree, in view 
of Rev. St. c. 107, § 17, and excepter must 
show, not merely granting or withholding of 
writ, but erroneous ruling in law or parent 
misuse of discretionary control. 
8. Mandamus <§=>I87(4)—There is no authority 
for deciding,disputed facts by full court. 
A mandamus case may not be brought to 
full court before ordering peremptory writ, 
since there is no authority for deciding disputed 
facts in mandamus proceeding by full court. 
9. Mandamus <§=>187(4)—Proceeding not con-
sidered by full court on reservation of ques-
tion of issuing alternative writ. 
Full court will not review proceedings in 
mandamus when brought up by reservation of 
question whether alternative writ is issuable 
on agreed facts, since such proceedings must 
stay where they begin till they run their com-
pass. 
On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, 
York County, at Law. 
Petition by Fred M. Libby and others for 
mandamus against the York Shore Water 
Company. Motion to dismiss was made, and 
question whether alternative writ was dis-
cretionally issuable was reserved for the law 
court Report discharged. 
Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHIL-
BROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, and BAS-
SETT, JJ. 
Stewart & Hawkes, of York Village, for pe-
titioners. 
Frank D. Marshall and Charles J. Nichols, 
both of Portland, for defendant. 
DUNN, J. The overt phase of this case is 
that of nonconformity to statutable proce-
dure in mandamus proceedings. This aspect 
will be seen against the history and the rule. 
These petitioners own certain land in the 
town of York. They are desirous that their 
property have the use of water. The public 
